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Abstract 
A pillar of behavioral research is that preferences are constructed during the process of choice.  A 
prominent finding is that uninformative numerical “anchors” influence judgment and valuation. It 
remains unclear whether such processes influence market equilibria.  We conduct two 
experiments that extend the study of anchoring to field settings.  The first experiment produces 
evidence that inexperienced consumers can be anchored in the value elicitation process, yet there 
is little evidence that experienced agents are influenced by anchors.  The second experiment finds 
that anchors have only transient effects on market outcomes which converge to equilibrium 
predictions after a few market periods.   
 
  Field Experiments on Anchoring of Economic Valuations 
I. Introduction 
Take the last three digits of your social security number.  Turn those numbers into 
a dollar value (i.e., if your numbers are 462 then they provide a value of $462).  Consider 
whether you would be willing to pay that dollar amount for a first edition of JRR 
Tolkien’s,  The Hobbit.  Now, how much would you actually pay for a first edition 
original copy?  A stylized result from laboratory experiments in economics and 
psychology is that the answer to the latter valuation question is strongly influenced by the 
dollar amount computed at the start.
1   
Critics of neoclassical theory have argued that the influence of uninformative 
anchors - such as the transformed social security number - refutes the notion that decision 
makers’ preferences are pre-defined, consistent, and stable (e.g. Slovic 1995).  A natural 
conclusion one might draw from studies of anchoring is that decisions may be influenced 
by irrelevant circumstances, and no optimization principles underlie even straightforward 
economic decisions.   
Although the laboratory evidence consonant with anchoring effects is 
considerable, the importance of anchoring for economic outcomes remains an open 
question.
2  One reason is that many of the experiments lack meaningful incentives, and 
we believe economists are justifiably inclined to discount results that may merely reflect 
mistakes made by unmotivated subjects.  Consistent with this view is the idea that, with 
appropriate incentives and feedback, anchoring effects should diminish and behavior 
more closely match predictions from neoclassical models.
3 Furthermore, even in those 
cases where inexperienced consumers constitute a considerable portion of the market, 
little is known about how such consumers influence equilibrium price and quantity.   
This study provides some insight into these questions by conducting two 
complementary field experiments within a well-functioning marketplace:  the sportscard 
market.  In contrast to anchoring studies conducted in classroom or laboratory settings, 
the sportscard marketplace has a number of advantages.  First, it is a natural setting for an 
examination of preference structures since it provides a rich array of subjects making 
decisions in a familiar environment.  Second, we can identify factors that arise 
endogenously, such as market experience or a person’s role in the marketplace, and impose the remaining controls necessary to implement a clean experiment to explore 
whether these or other factors foster or attenuate anchoring.  While we do not consider 
the sportscard market particularly worthy of study in its own right, when larger or “more 
important” markets are not available for experiments with parallel control, manipulating 
smaller scale markets such as the sportscard market has value in that we can learn 
behavioral tendencies from at least one naturally-occurring setting.  See Gneezy and Wu 
(2006) and Ariely et al. (2009) for further insights on these issues. 
In our first field experiment, we make use of an anchoring protocol very similar to 
the one described in our opening paragraph.   To give anchoring effects their best chance 
we exogenously vary the type of good, between subjects. The first good is a newly 
introduced variant into the market—an unopened package of sportscards.  Given its 
recent introduction, no established market price for the good existed at the time of our 
experiment, but subjects entering the market did expect to buy, sell, and trade related 
goods.  The second good - a jar of peanuts - is familiar, but unexpected in the sportscard 
marketplace, and ordinary consumers would not have expected to value such a good.  The 
novelty is a crucial element in some recent behavioral models that surmise that choices 
will be more anomalous in situations that present themselves as surprises (see, e.g., the 
recent work of Koszegi and Rabin (2008)).  By examining the valuations of both ordinary 
consumers and professional sports memorabilia dealers over both goods, we are able to 
explore whether market experience and market roles are associated with susceptibility to 
the anchoring protocol. 
The data provide some unique insights.  First, there is suggestive evidence that 
anchoring matters in the valuation exercise.  For ordinary consumers the anchor 
influences valuations for the good that they did not expect to value when entering the 
market (the jar of peanuts), but they were not influenced by the anchor when valuing the 
good they expected to buy, sell, and trade in the market (the unopened package of 
sportscards).  We find that dealers were not influenced by the anchor for either peanuts or 
the unopened package of sportscards.  Pooling subjects across market roles to investigate 
market experience, we find that individuals with one year or less of market experience 
are influenced by the uninformative anchor.   Our results suggest that a segment of the population in a naturally-occurring 
market could be susceptible to common anchoring effects.  Accordingly, these findings 
should influence the extensive literature that has concentrated on finding non-expected 
utility resolutions to paradoxes of choice, for example.  From a policy perspective, these 
results merit serious consideration in several circles.  For instance, the effects of 
anchoring have been of interest to practitioners of cost-benefit analysis for decades.  In 
the non-market valuation setting, evidence of anchoring effects has become an important 
heuristic for evaluating the reliability of stated preference methods such as contingent 
valuation that are used to estimate the value of public goods (e.g. Holmes and Kramer, 
1995; Green et al., 1998; Bateman et al., 2008).  Anchoring in this setting is consistent 
with the idea that the task of valuing non-market resources is hampered by consumers’ 
unfamiliarity with such decision environments and the complexity of the exercise.   
Empirical results herein present some guidance into the underlying reasons for the 
observed anchoring.   
While these behaviors should have import for survey based approaches to elicit 
non-market values, whether, and to what extent, these behavioral tendencies influence 
market equilibria is largely unknown.  Extant theory suggests that factors such as the 
composition of marginal and inframarginal traders, the trading institution, and other 
market particulars, might have significance in the transference of the anchoring result to 
markets.  To provide insight on this question, we design a second field experiment that 
makes use of a stronger anchoring treatment:  in a decentralized bargaining market, we 
vary information concerning previous transaction prices, which serve as the focal source 
of market uncertainty.  We find evidence that the anchor has some influence on early 
market transactions, but that the effect is transient.  Even in those cases where the market 
is populated entirely by inexperienced consumers, quantities and prices approach the 
intersection of supply and demand after a few rounds of market play.   
Taken together, the results in this paper suggest that when constant feedback 
mechanisms are in place and participants are able to receive signals of value and adjust 
their behavior accordingly, anchoring does not play a significant role in bilateral market 
outcomes.  In other important instances where feedback is limited, such as contingent 
valuation exercises commonly performed by government agencies, anchoring can have important and measurable effects.  Hence, the analyst should be aware of such effects and 
consider the properties of the situation when executing cost-benefit analysis. 
The remainder of our study proceeds as follows.  Section 2 summarizes the 
experimental design and the empirical results for the initial anchoring field experiment.  
Section 3 describes the experimental design and results for the bilateral market field 
experiment.  Section 4 concludes.   
II. Experiment Design and Results: Valuation Experiment 
Our first field experiment was conducted at sportscard tradeshows in Virginia, 
USA, where we set up booths similar to those of professional dealers in the sportscard 
market.  Our subjects include both ordinary consumers (non-dealers) and professional 
sports memorabilia dealers.  Non-dealer subjects attended the show as consumers and 
their presence in the marketplace indicates an existing interest in sports memorabilia.  
The non-dealers voluntarily approached the experimenter’s booth to take part in the 
protocol.  Dealer subjects were approached at their own booths prior to the opening of the 
show and asked to participate in the study.  Informed consent was obtained from all 
participants before introducing them to the protocol.  In the terminology of Harrison and 
List (2004), we implemented a framed field experiment.   
Table 1 presents the 2×2 design we employed in our first experiment; treatments 
varied by type of subject (dealer or non-dealer) and type of good.  The first good is an 
unopened pack of Upper Deck NFL cards, very recently released to the market.   
Importantly, since it was a recent release, consumers and dealers had little idea about the 
equilibrium price since production figures and demand were unknown.  As with any 
unopened pack of collectible cards, the value of the contents are uncertain, since different 
player’s cards have different values.  The pack we used had an additional element that 
emphasized the lottery-like aspect of the unopened deck.  These card packs had a small 
probability (approximately 2%) of containing a special trading card with a swatch of 
fabric from a player’s jersey worn during an actual NFL game.  The market value for 
such cards depends upon the player and year, but in general is not well established at the 
time of pack release.  During our experiment, one subject was able to sell a “jersey card” 
for $15—approximately three times the value of his own estimate of the original pack’s 
value—to a card dealer.  Combining the novelty of the good with this greater value uncertainty, we intended to give the anchoring protocol its best chance to succeed with a 
common market good. 
Our second good is a large jar of unsalted, shelled peanuts, which was chosen as a 
common good for which consumers may have an established value.  Only the dealers in 
the market might anticipate trading this good at the sportscard show, however.  Thus we 
denote it as the “unexpected” good for ordinary consumers.
4  The recent theoretical 
exercise of Kőszegi and Rabin (2008) that examines mistakes in implementing 
preferences provides the underpinnings for why such expectations might play an 
important role in observed behavior.  One interpretation of their work is that behavior 
will be more anomalous in situations that present themselves as surprises.  
In implementing the protocol, data were collected by a monitor working one-on-
one with each subject.  Each subject was endowed with one, and only one, of the two 
goods.  The endowed good was rotated randomly based on the time the non-dealer 
approached the table, but we intentionally oversampled consumers receiving peanuts, 
since pilot data showed that the variances were largest in this case, and our theory 
suggests that we were more likely to find considerable effects valuing this good.  After 
receiving the good, subjects were told that they would be asked two questions about 
selling the good back to the experimenter, after which a coin flip would determine which 
response was binding.  It was emphasized that they would keep either the good or cash, 
and that their valuation responses and the random process would determine the outcome.   
The anchoring protocol was initiated by asking the subjects to write the last three 
digits of their social security number on the provided questionnaire (see the Appendix for 
a copy of the questionnaire.)  Subjects were then asked the first valuation question: 
whether they would sell the good back for the price derived from the last three digits of 
their social security number.  For example, if the last three digits of their social security 
number were 123, their associated question was:  would you accept $1.23 to sell the good 
back to us?  Of course, this offer price was clearly uninformative, having been derived 
from a number that was known only to the subjects.   
In the second valuation task, we elicited willingness-to-accept (WTA) 
compensation for the endowed good using the Becker-DeGroot-Marschak (BDM) 
mechanism (Becker, DeGroot, and Marschak, 1964).  Our BDM protocol used a bag containing 41 paper slips, upon each of which was a price.  Prices ranged from $0.00 - 
$10.00 in 25 cent increments.  It was explained to the subjects that we wanted to know 
the minimum compensation that they required for parting with the good with which they 
had been endowed.  Since we were not interested in testing the incentive properties of the 
BDM, our protocol included an explanation that the optimal strategy was to offer one’s 
true minimum acceptable level of compensation.   
After making their BDM offer, a coin was flipped to determine which choice—
the dichotomous choice or the BDM response—would be executed.  If the dichotomous 
choice question was selected, subjects who answered “no” kept the good, and those who 
said “yes” sold the good for the SSN value rounded up to the nearest quarter of a dollar.  
If the BDM mechanism was chosen, a bid price was drawn randomly from the bag.  If the 
bid was greater than or equal to the subject’s offer, they were paid the bid amount and the 
good was returned to the experimenter; otherwise they received no monetary payment 
and kept the good.  In all cases, subjects were asked to fill out a short survey before the 
account was settled. Survey responses are used as control variables in the regressions 
reported below.  
Our protocol is similar to classic examples in the psychology literature (see the 
citations provided in footnote 2), and more recent work in both economics and 
psychology including that of  Ariely, Lowenstein, and Prelec 2003, and recent 
replications of the market good component of their study (Bergman et al. 2010; 
Fudenberg, Levine, and Manniadis, 2012).
5  The original explanation for the prevalence 
of anchoring is due to Tversky and Kahneman (1974, p. 1128) who argue that “people 
make estimates by starting from an initial value that is adjusted to yield a final answer”, 
and that “adjustments are typically insufficient.”  More recent work links insufficient 
adjustment to the need for cognitive effort (Epley and Gilovich, 2006; Bergman et al., 
2010; see also Oechssler et al., 2009).  These findings emphasize the contribution of the 
field setting provides for the understanding of anchoring, since both intuition and 
evidence from previous studies suggest that the heterogeneity in market experience is 
associated with differences in cognitive costs for valuation tasks (List and Lucking-
Reiley, 2000).  
Experiment Results Summary statistics for the anchoring experiments are presented in Table 2.  Forty-
two percent of our subjects were sportscard dealers, and 65 percent of subjects were 
randomly endowed with the jar of peanuts.  The WTA (offer) and random anchor (soc) 
both varied widely, between $0 - $10 and $0.09 - $9.99, respectively.  Average 
experience with the sportscard market (mktyrs) was 15 years; our sample consisted 
primarily of men.   
Before we begin with the results summary, we should note that overall, 19 percent 
of subjects provided inconsistent responses to the two valuation queries.  The 
inconsistencies were exhibited by subjects who stated a minimum WTA less (greater) 
than the DC offer that they had initially refused (accepted).  For both subject groups, the 
majority of inconsistencies (74 percent) were found in the peanut treatment, and those 
exhibiting inconsistencies had less market experience than those who were consistent.
6  
Approximately 3 percent provided a minimum WTA exactly equal to their anchors.  The 
remaining 78 percent provided consistent responses in which WTA was different from 
the anchoring value.  For completeness, we present the results with and without the 
inconsistent responders in the sample. 
Perusal of the data provides a first result: 
Result 1: In the aggregate data, anchoring does not affect economic 
valuations. 
Preliminary evidence for this result can be found in Table 3.  To begin, we use a simple 
null hypothesis that the BDM valuation responses (offer) are independent of the random 
anchor (soc).  Following Ariely, Loewenstein, and Prelec (2003), we split the aggregate 
sample by median social security number.  Row 1 in Table 3 contains the pooled data 
summary.  In this case, for the entire sample, those with high social security numbers 
place a sell value of $4.41 on average, whereas those with a low social security number 
place a sell value of $4.17 on the good.  A similar data pattern is observed in the data set 
that excludes inconsistent subjects:  a selling price of $4.46 versus $4.24.  While the data 
tendencies are directionally in accord with the anchoring hypothesis, a Mann-Whitney 
test reveals that the difference is not statistically significant for either the overall sample 
(p = 0.32), or the consistent responders (p = 0.35), at conventional levels.   To provide an additional test of the null hypothesis, we regress offer on the social 
security value and the control variables age, education, gender, and income which were 
gathered via the survey.  Model 1 in Table 4 provides empirical estimates for all data and 
the subset of consistent responders.
7  Evidence of the ability to anchor market participants 
would arise from a positive coefficient on soc that is both economically and statistically 
significant. We find that the unconditional results summarized in Table 3 are supported 
by the regression model.  Coefficients are small in magnitude and have p-values of 0.73 
and 0.82 for all and consistent responders, respectively.  Thus, even after controlling for 
individual specific observables, we find that the offer is not unduly influenced by the 
uninformative anchor in the pooled data.   
Clearly, however, data aggregation could be masking important heterogeneities.  
Upon parsing the data at a finer level, we find our next result: 
Result 2A: There is some evidence that ordinary consumers are influenced by 
the random anchor when valuing the unexpected good. 
Result 2B: There is little evidence that market professionals can be anchored 
for either good. 
Table 3 provides the first evidence to support Result 2.  First, examining the data by 
subject type, our non-parametric tests yield evidence that the anchor has a modest effect 
on values for non-dealers.  Inspection at the level of treatments makes clear that the result 
is associated only with their valuation of the peanuts:  in this case, we find a marginally 
significant effect of the social security number among the consistent responders at the p = 
0.09 level.  Yet, as Table 3 indicates, there is little evidence of anchoring for non-dealers 
valuing the sportscard pack or for dealers valuing either good.     
Summarizing, we find no evidence of anchoring for dealers, but some evidence of 
anchoring for non-dealers.  To explore the role of experience in more detail, we pool the 
dealer and non-dealer data and examine the effect of years of experience in the market. 
The conclusion from this analysis we present as Result 3. 
Result 3A: For subjects who have one year or less of experience in the 
marketplace, we find considerable evidence of anchoring.  
Result 3B: For subjects with more one year of experience in the marketplace, 
we find no evidence of anchoring. We begin discussion of result 3 by noting that sample sizes are small at low levels of 
market experience. However, we discover interesting tendencies in the data that are 
important for the broader questions raised by the anchoring literature.  We find 
considerable evidence of anchoring in the responses of the 14 subjects who have one year 
or less of experience in the market.  Again splitting the sample around the median SSN, 
we find that the Mann-Whitney test yields a statistically significant difference (p = 0.08) 
for new market participants that is consistent with the existence of anchored responses.  
Among this group, the mean offer for those above (below) the median SSN is 6.00 (4.49), 
a difference of $1.50, or 33%.  Furthermore, removing an inconsistent individual who 
refused to sell at the SSN price of $9.19 and then offered $0.50 in the BDM yields an 
anchoring effect that is statistically significant at the p < 0.02 level.  However, among 
subjects with more than one year of experience we find no significant effects of the 
anchoring protocol.  
  Model 2 in Table 4 provides regression results that inform results 2 and 3.  The 
specification includes indicator variables for the dealer subject pool, the peanut treatment 
(nuts) and for new market participants (new - indicating subjects with one year or less 
experience in the sportscard markets).  Interactions of treatment and experience variables 
with the social security anchor are also included as well as the demographic controls used 
in Model 1.   
As in the pooled results, the coefficient on soc is not statistically significant 
supporting the nonparametric tests for the non-dealers when valuing the sportscards – the 
baseline in the regression model.  The same results hold for the linear combinations of 
soc when interacted with treatment indicator variables.
8  The fact that the soc variable in 
combination with soc×nuts  is not significant (p = 0.51 (all), p = 0.64 (consistent)) 
detracts from the robustness of Result 2A regarding the anchoring of peanut valuations 
by non-dealers.  
With regard to market experience, however, the nonparametric results are 
supported by parametric regression.  The soc and soc×new coefficients are jointly 
significant for both all and consistent respondents.
9  The magnitude of the effect is 
economically significant. As noted in the discussion of the nonparametric results, the 
difference across median SSN yields a 33% percent increase in WTA for those with the high anchor.  The relevant coefficients suggest that a one percent change in the anchor 
yields a reflect a 0.536 (0.565) percent change in WTA  for all (consistent) respondents. 
The coefficients can be interpreted in the context of the anchoring and adjustment 
model of Tversky and Kahneman (1974).  Their model suggests that people first consider 
the value of the anchor and then move, though often incompletely, toward what would be 
their unanchored response.  Since a coefficient of zero implies complete adjustment, the 
measured coefficient of 0.536, in the model with all respondents, implies that 1-.536 = 
0.464 is the magnitude of the adjustment towards the true value.
10  While the caveat 
regarding the small sample remains, the result does suggest that this is an area in which 
additional research is warranted. In conjunction with results from ALP (2003) who 
showed that arbitrary initial valuations could demonstrate coherence over time, our 
findings suggest that the question of whether initial innocuous cues influence even 
experienced consumers is one that deserves further study.  Our second experiment 
provides an initial examination of this question in the field, in a multi-lateral bargaining 
setting.  
III.  Experiment Design and Results: Bilateral Market Experiment 
Whether, and to what extent, the anchoring affects observed above influence the 
operation of markets is an open issue that undoubtedly depends critically on the market 
institution.  For example, making use of the Walrasian tatonnement mechanism, Becker 
(1962) proved that several fundamental features of economic analysis, such as correctly 
sloped supply and demand schedules, may result even when agents are irrational, serving 
to sufficiently relax the utility-maximizing assumption inherent in economic modeling.  
Similarly, using zero-intelligence traders, Gode and Sunder (1993) illustrate that the 
efficiency of the double-auctions institution derives largely from its structure rather than 
from individual learning. 
In this section, we explore how anchoring in markets affects market outcomes in 
multi-lateral bargaining contexts.  Our market treatments are similar to Chamberlin 
(1948), as extended recently to naturally occurring markets by List and Millimet (2008), 
of which the design description follows.  In our bilateral market sessions, each 
participant’s experience typically followed four steps: (1) consideration of the invitation to participate in an experiment, (2) learning the market rules, (3) actual market 
participation, and (4) conclusion of the experiment and exit interview.   
In Step 1, before the market opened, a monitor approached dealers at the 
sportscard show and inquired about their interest in participating in an experiment that 
would take about 45 minutes.  Since most dealers are accompanied by at least one other 
employee, it was not difficult to obtain their agreement after it was explained to them that 
they could earn money during the experiment.  Non-dealers were recruited from people 
milling around the marketplace.   
Once the prerequisite number of dealers (sellers) and non-dealers agreed to 
participate, monitors thoroughly explained the experiment’s rules in Step 2.  The 
experimental instructions were standard, and borrowed from Davis and Holt (1993, pp. 
47-55) with the necessary adjustments.  Before continuing, a few key aspects of the 
experimental design should be highlighted.  First, all individuals were informed that they 
would receive a $10 participation payment upon completion of the experiment.  In 
addition, following Smith (1964), to ensure that marketers would engage in a transaction 
at their reservation prices, we provided a $0.05 commission for each executed trade for 
both buyers and sellers.   
Second, the non-dealers were informed that the experiment consisted of five 
periods and that they would be buyers in the experiment.  In each of the five periods, we 
used Smith’s (1976) induced value mechanism by providing each buyer with a “buyer’s 
card” containing a number – known only to that buyer – representing the maximum price 
that he or she would be willing to pay for one unit of the commodity.  Dealers were 
informed that they would be sellers in the market and, in each of the five periods, that 
each would be given a “seller’s card” containing three sequential numbers – known only 
to that seller – representing the minimum price that he or she would be willing to sell up 
to three units.  Importantly, both buyers and sellers were informed that this information 
was strictly private and that reservation values would change each period.  They were 
also informed about the number of buyers and sellers in the market (explained more fully 
below) and informed that agents may have different values.  Third, the monitor explained how earnings (beyond the participation and 
commission payments) would be determined.  The difference between the contract price 
and the maximum reservation price determined the market earnings of buyers; the 
difference between the contract price and the minimum reservation price determined 
sellers’ earnings.  Several examples illustrated the irrationality associated with buying 
(selling) the commodity above (below) the induced value.   
Fourth, the homogeneous commodities used in the experiment were 1982 Topps 
Ben Oglivie baseball cards, upon which decorative moustaches had been drawn, thereby 
rendering the cards valueless outside of the experiment.  Consequently, the assignment 
given to buyers was clear:  enter the marketplace and purchase the Oglivie “moustache” 
card for as little as possible.  Likewise, the task confronting sellers was equally as clear, 
and an everyday occurrence:  sell the Oglivie “moustache” card for as much as possible.  
The cards and participating dealers were clearly marked to ensure buyers had no trouble 
finding the commodity of interest.  Finally, buyers and sellers engaged in two five-minute 
practice periods to gain experience with the market.   
In Step 3, subjects participated in the bilateral market.  Each market session 
consisted of five market periods, each lasting five minutes.  After each five-minute 
period, a monitor privately gathered the buyers and gave each a new buyer’s card; a 
different monitor privately gave each seller a new seller’s card.  Note that throughout the 
market process careful attention was paid to prohibit discussions between sellers (or 
buyers) that could induce collusive outcomes.  Much like the early writers in this area, we 
wanted to give neoclassical theory its best chance to succeed.  Step 4 concluded the 
experiment, where subjects were paid their earnings in private.   
We follow this procedure in each of three treatments.  Treatment 1 is the baseline, 
which we includes 12 (4) buyers (sellers).   The buyers have unitary demand whereas the 
sellers have up to 3 items they can sell.  Figure 1 presents buyer and seller induced 
values, which are taken from Davis and Holt (1993, pp. 14-15).  In Figure 1, each step 
represents a distinct induced value that was given to buyers (demand curve) and sellers 
(supply curve).  The extreme point of the intersection of the buyer and supplier rent areas in Figure 1 yields $37 in rents per period, which occurs at the static price/quantity of 
Price = $13 – $14 and Quantity = 7.    
Treatments 2 and 3, which are the novelty of this experiment, augment Treatment 
1 by announcing a previous price that was realized in past experiments.  This price is 
announced to all experimental participants in the following form: “in a previous 
experiment identical to this one, the first transaction occurred at a price of $X.”  Previous 
literature (e.g., Simonson and Drolet, 2004) suggests that once the decision to buy (or 
sell) has been taken, value judgments “are most susceptible to influence by anchors 
relating to market prices.”  Indeed, summarizing the results from four experiments, 
Simonson and Drolet (2004) support this reasoning and highlight the importance of the 
source of uncertainty as a moderator of susceptibility to anchoring effects.  Thus, given 
that our buyers and sellers have certainly taken the step to be buyers or sellers of their 
good, anchoring the source of uncertainty is important. 
In Treatment 2 we announce only one price realization (either a high or a low 
price), and this announcement takes place directly before market period 1 commences.  
No extra information is given beyond that given in Treatment 1 from that point onwards.  
When announcing a high (low) price, we use the second step on the aggregate demand 
(supply) function: $18 ($9), which were each observed as the first transaction price in 
previous experiments.  Due to symmetry, this price is $4 from the equilibrium price 
boundary of $14 ($13). 
In Treatment 3, we announce a distinct high or low price directly before each of 
the five market periods commences.  The high price signal is drawn randomly from 
integers on the uniform distribution [15, 18]; the low price signal is also randomly drawn 
from integers on a uniform distribution, but over [9, 12].  Accordingly, putting these two 
treatments together, we can explore both short and long run effects of price anchors.  Our 
usage of announced random anchors as previous market outcomes is directly at the heart 
of the source of uncertainty in these markets.  By appropriately choosing plausible 
realized prices (taken from our previous experiment to avoid deception), we give 
anchoring its best shot because this announced price might contain important information 
pertaining to the underlying equilibrium price (indeed, by rewarding the entire source of price variation to anchoring we overestimate the power of anchoring).  Alternatively, by 
following the literature and using the same induced value schedules across all five market 
periods, our tests represent a demanding one for anchoring.   
Experiment Results 
  Table 5 contains summary statistics for the experimental data.  We gathered data 
from 3 baseline sessions, 6 ‘Treatment 2’ sessions (3 high signal and 3 low signal), and 6 
‘Treatment 3’ sessions (3 high signal and 3 low signal).  Given that there are sixteen 
unique subjects in each session, our entire design includes data drawn from 240 subjects.  
Entries in Table 5 provide summary price (quantity) data in the top (bottom) panel.  A 
first insight is that the baseline treatment yields results that suggest the predictive power 
of supply and demand functionals.  This result is in line with previous research, and 
points to the power of the simple situation of supply and demand curves.
11  Perusal of the 
data summary for the various treatments yields a first formal comparative static finding: 
Result 4:  Price and quantity realizations in bilateral trading markets 
are influenced by anchors, but the effect is transient 
A first piece of evidence to support Result 4 is that prices realized for the first 
market trade are linked to the anchor.  Whereas the average price in the high anchor 
Treatment 2 is $17.70, the average price is only $9.50 in the low anchor Treatment 2.  
These differences are statistically significant at conventional levels using a Wilcoxon 
signed rank test.  While the average price differences for the low and high anchor 
Treatment 2 remain in the first few periods, by period 3 the prices have reasonably 
converged.  Any remaining price differences are small in periods 4 and 5 of Treatment 2.  
These data patterns suggest that the initial anchor does not have important long-run 
effects on prices.   
Treatment 3 data provide a different test in that agents receive a fresh signal at the 
beginning of each market period.  Similar to the Treatment 2 data, in this case we again 
find that in the early periods the signal (high or low) influences prices.  For example, the 
initial trade is $16.30 ($13.30) in the high (low) treatment, and the first few periods show 
that prices in the high anchor treatment are above those observed in the low anchor 
treatment.  Yet, the signals lose their power in the latter periods, where we find that little difference in prices exists across the high and low anchor treatments.  Interestingly, in a 
regression model that uses the observed price as the regressand, and the signal, the 
market period, and the interaction of signal and market period as regressors, we find that 
in the early periods the signal has a significant influence, but by period 3 the signal no 
longer has an influence on the market transaction prices.  This result suggests that even in 
the short run anchors do not have considerable influence for those agents who are 
experienced with market fundamentals.   
Such transient effects are also found when examining quantities traded in the 
market.  In this case, however, there are no observed differences across the high and low 
price signal treatments:  in each instance the market is stifled by the anchor in the early 
periods.  This is due to one side of the market holding out for unrealistic prices, due to the 
random price signal.  Yet, this too wanes, as by the fourth period the expected market 
quantity is realized in all treatments.   
IV. Conclusions 
Many of the standard results of welfare economics—such as the interpretation of 
market surplus measures, the Pareto Efficiency of perfectly competitive market 
outcomes, and the rationing and allocative functions of market prices—are predicated on 
the notion of durable and meaningful consumer preferences.  An individual demand 
schedule should reflect maximum willingness to pay for units of a commodity, ceteris 
paribus.  Likewise, producer decisions should be grounded in an understanding of 
technology and cost that reflects the profit motive.  The assumption that primals of 
preference and technology are well-defined and stable has immense normative 
significance since the correspondence between observed market behavior and underlying 
theoretical foundations is at the heart of the application of microeconomic theory to 
welfare analysis and public policy.   
This assumption has been challenged over the past three decades by those who 
argue that agents construct their preferences during the valuation process.  Our study 
begins by extending the investigation of anchoring—one of the modalities through which 
preferences may be constructed—to a field environment.  The extent to which decisions 
might be influenced by random signals is a topic which has received less attention in the 
economics and business literatures (Rothschild 1973; Sterman 1989; Schoemaker 1990), but of course represents one of the most robust findings in experimental psychology.
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complementary field experiment examines the effect of anchoring in a decentralized 
bargaining market.  We view this as an initial step in exploring anchoring in a natural 
trading institution with salient incentives.   
We find evidence that anchoring matters in the valuation exercise. Valuations of 
both inexperienced market participants and ordinary consumers (nonprofessionals) were 
affected by the anchoring protocol, although the anchor only influences ordinary 
consumers for the good that they did not expect to trade in this market setting.    We find 
that experienced consumers were not influenced by the anchor for either class of goods.   
The results of our bilateral trading field experiment complement the valuation 
exercise.  We find that price and quantity realizations are influenced by anchors, but the 
effect is transient.  Price realizations for the first market trade are significantly influenced 
by the anchor, but price and quantity realizations converge to neoclassical predictions by 
the third round of trading.  Thus, potentially informative anchors appear to have little 
influence on aggregate market behavior in a bilateral trading experiment in either the 
short run, when a new signal is offered up before each trading period, or the long run 
when multiple rounds of trading occur after exposure to an anchor.  Overall, our results 
provide evidence that anchoring effects are not persistent in markets with repeated 
opportunities to engage in exchange within a common, static trading regime.  Yet, they 
do highlight the import that anchoring effects potentially have on cost-benefit analysis. 
Methodologically, our study highlights that using field experiments and/or 
"special" markets (like those for sportscards) to focus on deep questions that are hard to 
take on with observational field data, or in markets that are more important per se, 
represents a useful first attempt in the field to learn about fundamental tenets of human 
behavior.  In this spirit, continued exploration of the extent to which individuals with 
different levels of market experience are influenced in the valuation of both private and 
public goods should provide fundamental insight into basic assumptions of 
microeconomic theory and the functioning of various market structures.  Moreover, 
additional research on the influence of standard valuation protocols embedded in survey 
questions should yield additional insights into assessment of consumer preferences for 
public goods, as well as provide guidance to scholars engaged in cost-benefit analysis.    References 
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 * Author names and affiliations deleted for purposes of review.  
1 For those interested Tolkien fans, only 1,500 copies of the first edition were printed.  An Arizona buyer 
recently purchased a first edition copy for $65,000 from a New York bookseller.  See 
http://www.abebooks.com/docs/10-anniversary/powers-10.shtml. 
2 There are a number of valuation exercises that show the effectiveness of an anchoring manipulation (see, 
e.g, Johnson and Schkade, 1989; Slovic, 1995; Bettman, Luce, and Payne, 1998; Green et al., 1998; 
Hoeffler and Ariely, 1999, Ariely, Loewenstein, and Prelec, 2003; Bateman et al. 2008, Bergman et al. 
2010).  Taken together, these results suggest strong effects, even over goods that subjects have experience 
in consuming.  Yet, anchoring results run much deeper than valuation exercises.  For instance, anchoring 
has been found to be important in answers to factual questions (Tversky and Kahneman, 1974; Epley and 
Gilovich, 2006), the estimation of probabilities (Wright and Anderson, 1989), predictions of future 
performance (Switzer and Sniezek, 1991), social judgments (Chapman and Johnson, 2002), legal decisions 
(Englich and Mussweiler, 2001), and savings rates (Choi et al. 2012), to name a few.  It also represents a 
key component of theories of preference reversal (Schkade and Johnson, 1989) and the effect of ambiguity 
on probability judgments (Einhorn and Hogarth, 1985).  The interested reader should see Epley (2004) for 
an excellent overview of the literature and the theories underlying how and why anchoring influences 
decisions. Furnham and Boo (2011) also provide a thorough review.  
3 Not all studies report strong anchoring effects. Among the few that report weak or negligible effects, 
however, the same concerns about the power of incentives can arise. For example, Chapman and Johnson 
(1994) use extreme anchors to test the limits of anchoring in a classroom experiment in which all responses 
are hypothetical.  In a laboratory setting, Fudenberg, Levine, and Maniadis (2012) largely fail to replicate 
the strong anchoring results of Ariely, Loewenstein, and Prelec’s (2003) classroom study.  The use of large 
participation fees in the laboratory study resulted in compensation that is largely unrelated to the anchoring 
protocol.  A strength of our experimental design is that incentives parallel those occurring in a market 
setting. Each subject is anchored on one good and the compensation is associated entirely with responses to 
the anchoring protocol.   Further strengths of the field design are discussed in the text.  
4 We note that dealers entering the market likely expect to be offered a trade with just about anything in this 
market.  For instance, one of the coauthors was once offered a pair of “personally worn” Marilyn Monroe 
panty hose in trade for a Ken Griffey Jr. rookie card.  He politely declined.   
5 In addition to the anchoring of market goods Ariely, Loewenstein and Prelec (2003) implemented an 
anchoring protocol that elicited WTA for novel distasteful beverages. In this setting they observed initial 
anchoring and subsequent responses that were coherent given the initial anchored value. The authors 
characterize the responses as “coherent arbitrariness” and argue that their evidence implies that anchored 
responses may have a residual influence on market behavior among experienced consumers.  
6 A Mann-Whitney test of differences in market experience, measured in market years, across groups of 
consistent and inconsistent responders yielded p = 0.08.  Further, roughly three-fourths of the inconsistent                                                                                                                                                                              
responders made offers to sell at a price greater than their social security number when they had previously 
agreed to sell at that price.  The attempt to sell at a price higher than the anchor value suggests that the 
inconsistent subjects misunderstood the properties of the BDM mechanism, and may have believed they 
were in a bargaining situation, despite our instruction to report their true value.   
7 In our regressions, we exclude two influential observations from both non-dealer models.  These 
individuals refuse to sell at anchor values greater than $9.00 but then make offers of fifty cents or less in 
the BDM, indicating confusion or inattention.  Standard errors are calculated using the White sandwich 
estimator (White, 1980) since the Breusch-Pagan test detects heteroscedasticity (Breusch and Pagan, 1979). 
8 Consistent with the fact that dealer valuations are somewhat higher for those with SSN below the median, 
there is what appears to be a negative anchoring effect associated with the soc + soc×dealer coefficient.  
Given the one-sided nature of our hypothesis we believe that this is an artifact and do not believe we have 
discovered a new phenomenon of economic significance.  The positive coefficient on soc×dealer×nuts 
restricts this artifact to the dealers in the sportscard treatment. 
9 For all (consistent) respondents the joint significance of soc and new yields p = 0.005 (p = 0.004).  
10 The insignificant coefficients for the other treatments imply complete adjustment from the anchored 
value.  
11 We also gathered data in a treatment that used an anchor of $13.50, the midpoint of the equilibrium 
prediction of the supply and demand curve intersection.  These data did not significantly differ from the 
baseline treatment data, suggesting that this market can yield efficient outcomes with or without anchors 
present.   
12 One should take care not to jump to inference concerning underlying preferences from these experiments 
too quickly.  In many cases, important properties of the situation change across exercises, and changes in 
these properties themselves might induce agents to behave differently (see Levitt and List, 2007). 
 
 
 